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Developing State Inclusiveness Index: Conceptualization and Measurement

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Non-Coercive Influence in World Politics: Intersection with State Inclusive Index



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4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, we were tasked with finding correlations between State Inclusiveness Index (SII) and soft power in world politics. As we suspected, this was not an easy task since measuring power, particularly soft power, is not straightforward. In Joseph Nye's words "[p]ower is also like love, easier to experience than to define or measure, but no less real for that" (Nye, 2004: 1). Indices that measure a country's soft power, or other indices that rank countries' influence in other dimensions of world politics, have their share of conceptual and methodological problems. Most measurements fail to control for coercion and inducement and end up finding high correlations between hard and soft power (Singh & MacDonald, 2017). Despite the problems with soft power as a concept (Ayhan, 2020; Bially Mattern, 2005), and shortcomings of its measurement attempts (Singh & MacDonald, 2017; Yun, 2018), they are not without their merits since they present a relative – albeit incomplete – picture of a country's assets. Using these measures, we aim to examine how a country's multidimensional inclusiveness may be correlated with its relative influence in world politics by looking at various datasets that give us proxies for non-coercive influence in world politics.

This chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, we introduce our conceptual framework for exploring non-coercive influence in world politics. In section three, we introduce the datasets that we used in this study along with SII and explain our methodology. In section four, we show our findings. In section five we discuss our findings and suggest their implications.

4.2 Conceptual Framework

While providing an inclusive discussion on non-coercive influence probably requires volumes, in this paper we focus on four lines of research that together make up our conceptual framework: 1) self-restraint as understood in Lebow's interpretation of classical realism; 2) English School's international society and world society; 3) the place of reputation, status, and moral authority in world politics; and 4) soft power.

Classical realism is portrayed as a theory which is mainly about lust for power to dominate others (Morgenthau, 1947: 34). The calls for prudence and self-restraint by scholars such as Thucydides and Morgenthau were often interpreted as the moral antidote to the analytical reality of lust for power and hubris (Lebow, 2007). However, since ancient Greeks, the call for self-restraint and respecting the self-esteem of others was meant to avoid resistance to one's power and to ensure others' compliance with one's policies (Lebow, 2008). It is this considering the interest of others that can help a hegemon to prolong its domination. In other words, self-restraint and respecting others' self-esteem are suggested not as a normative and moral policy, but as an enlightened self-interested policy. A hegemon that self-restrains itself can rely less on military capabilities to get others to comply with its policies (Lebow, 2010). Although not referring to Lebow's similar interpretations, Yan (2014: 162) calls this "moral realism" which asks for "self-disciplined morality" that can help a state obtain more international support for its policies.

While this interpretation of classical realism asks for self-restraint for merely self-interests that exclusively emphasize national responsibilities, English School's concept of international society points to international responsibilities that help maintain order in a region or in the world. English School does not deny the anarchic nature of international system but suggests that a more orderly international society, where states share norms, values and institutions that help them cooperate with each other to overcome collective action problems for international responsibilities, coexist and is in constant interplay with anarchic international system (Buzan, 2014). In that sense, status quo states – states that want to maintain the current world order

and its institutions – would have more vested interests in going beyond their exclusive self-interests and aiming to pursue international responsibilities as well. Some of their activities, in cooperation with transnational advocacy networks, also go beyond the state-centric realm of international relations and contribute to the welfare of humanity and nature (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Wexler, 2003). English School refers to this plane of international relations as world society where responsibilities for humanity and nature weigh heavier than national (international system) or international responsibilities (international society) (Buzan, 2004).

Regardless of the theoretical lens one puts on to interpret world politics, the argument that interstate relations are social is virtually uncontested. Although it is the constructivists who pay more attention to how social relations between states co-constitute international relations, and by extension international system, realists also consider social aspects. An actor's status, its position in a social hierarchy (Renshon, 2017), and its reputation, beliefs about its traits or behavioral tendencies (Dafoe, Renshon, & Huth, 2014), are considered important for realists and others alike (Gilpin, 1981; Khong, 2019). While realist interpretations focus more on great power status and reputation as the recognition of one's military strength (Gilpin, 1981), other studies show that reputation as a just hegemon (Kang, 2020; Lebow, 2008), reputation as a credible ally (Crescenzi, Kathman, Kleinberg, & Wood, 2012; Gibler, 2008), reputation as a good international citizen (Becker-Jakob & Hofmann, 2013; A. F. Cooper, Higgott, & Nossal, 1993), and reputation for moral authority (Hall, 1997; Wohlforth, de Carvalho, Leira, & Neumann, 2018) are significant for influence in world politics.

There have been fragmented references to non-coercive influence in world politics. Joseph Nye's (1990) soft power concept became one of the earlier, for the lack of a better word, containers for all these references. Having written right after the end of the Cold War, Nye (1990) suggest that the United States is "bound to lead" but it would not be possible with reliance solely on hard power and economic power. He argued that the United States' culture, domestic politics and foreign policies must be attractive and persuasive so that they can help change preferences of others without resort to coercion or inducement (Nye, 2004, 2011). The concept was picked up by

scholars, journalists and political leaders worldwide as the idea of exerting influence in world politics with attraction and persuasiveness deemed to be attractive and persuasive itself.¹⁰⁶ Furthermore, building on Morriss' (1987) philosophical approach to power in world politics, Nye (2011) suggested that power does not need to be competitive but rather actors could accomplish common goals through power with others. This approach is in line with the international society of English School which emphasize collaboration for international responsibilities to tackle common transnational problems.

Mainstream international relations theories, particularly neorealism, neo-institutionalism and Wendtian constructivism, focus on the international system, and by extension on great powers who are more likely to influence changes in the system. However, all four lines of research outlined above apply, in varying degrees, to small and middle powers.

Many of the global middle powers are regional great powers who aim for and / or try to maintain leadership in their regions (D. A. Cooper, 2013; Østerud, 1992). In order to avoid resistance to their leadership in the region, and / or their foreign policies in general globally, they need to take into account self-esteem of others the same way it is for global great powers. Smaller powers can augment their representativeness in multilateral settings, for example occupying a seat at an intergovernmental organization, if their foreign policy agendas take the self-esteem of others into account.

Furthermore, particularly traditional middle powers,¹⁰⁷ such as Canada, Australia, and Sweden among others, have vested interests in the maintenance of the current world order which reflects their values embedded in the "standard of civilization" (Gong, 1984). Hence, their foreign policy behaviors have shown preference of multilateralism to transnational problems and promoting international society's interests with an emphasis on moral authority and being good international citizens (A. F. Cooper et al., 1993; Henrikson, 2005). These preferences help these small and middle powers to have a reputation as normative forces and to increase their visibility in world politics. Such reputation can be the only game for these smaller powers who

106) Nevertheless, this enthusiasm in the concept made it a fuzzy catchall phrase which in most cases did not have much analytical validity. For more on critical perspectives on soft power, see Ayhan (2020); Bially Mattern (2005).

107) On differences between traditional and emerging powers, see Jordaan (2003).

do not have as much economic or military resources to rely on to influence their fates as greater powers (de Carvalho & Neumann, 2014; Wohlforth et al., 2018). In other words, smaller powers can be able to punch above their weight if they enjoy moral authority that is recognized by others.

A state's inclusiveness both in domestic politics and in its foreign policies have the potential to augment its moral authority in world politics. Inclusiveness as a concept captures what had been emphasized in the conceptual framework above: respecting self-esteem of others; significant efforts on inclusive international responsibilities beyond exclusive national responsibilities; building reputation as a normative good international citizen; attractive domestic policy that cares about foreigners; and persuasive foreign policy that emphasize multilateralism and power with others.

We would expect countries that rank higher in SII to have more influence in world politics relative to their actual material capabilities. In the next section, we introduce the datasets that we used in this study and our methodology.

4.3 Datasets and Methodology

The datasets that we used in this study to compare against SII have most of the OECD countries that are included in the SII, but not all countries. Furthermore, each index has quite different measurements for their scores. For these reasons, we relied on rankings, rather than index scores to measure correlations between respective datasets and SII. We used Spearman's correlation for measurements. For consistency and validity in all correlation measurements, we have re-ranked the measures. We did not use the absolute rank the countries had in the measures. Since we were studying solely a subset of countries – those that were also included in SII – we created a new ranking containing only these countries. In other words, we re-ranked the countries that we examined leaving out countries that were not available in either one of the datasets that we were measuring the correlation between. Furthermore, we generated scatterplots based on these rankings. Below, we explain the datasets that we used in this study.

Representation at International Organizations

A country's representation at intergovernmental organization's bureaucracy, in terms of having their citizens as staff, is often seen as a matter of influence (Novosad & Werker, 2019; Parizek & Stephen, 2020). When considering these intergovernmental organizations not merely as aggregation of member states' interests but instead attaching agency to their bureaucracy (Breitmeier, 1997), it becomes more evident that certain interests can be embedded within these organizations creating capacity for influence (Barnett & Duvall, 2005). We use two kinds of data regarding representation at international organizations: 1) number of staff at international organizations per capita which we gathered from Parizek and Stephen's study (2020); and 2) excess representation at senior Secretariat positions at United Nations "which is the share of senior Secretariat positions held by a country, divided by that country's share of world population" (Novosad & Werker, 2019: 3) which we gathered from the cited study.¹⁰⁸⁾ For both data, we rank the countries to measure their correlation with SII.

Good Country Index

The Good Country Index is a normative index that measures countries' contribution to the world beyond their borders relative to its material capabilities, using objective data (Good Country, 2020). The promise of the Good Country Index is that it is the quantified version of English School's international and world societies as the idea of this index is to bring to forefront the countries contribution "to the common good of humanity" (Good Country, 2020). The Good Country Index gives scores to countries based on their contributions, relative to their GDP, to the world in the fields of science and technology, culture, international peace and security, world order, planet and climate, prosperity and equality, and health and wellbeing (Good Country, 2020). While SII is mainly interested in inclusiveness in domestic politics, The Good Country Index is exclusively interested in countries' activities beyond their borders. We used

¹⁰⁸⁾ For more on the discussions regarding representation at international organizations, and the methodology of the datasets, please refer to Novosad and Werker (2019) and Parizek and Stephen (2020).

the countries' ranks in the Good Country Index in our analysis. Furthermore, we created a crosstab using ranks-based quartiles for both the Good Country Index and SII and computed the chi-square.

Soft Power 30

Soft Power 30 is an index that ranks 30 countries, mainly G20 countries, in terms of soft power. Compared to previous similar studies such as the Anholt-Ipsos Nation Brands Index (2020), Soft Power 30 uses both "objective" data that is based on statistics regarding how countries are faring in various fields, and "subjective" data based on international polling to measure public opinion of these countries (Mcclory, Portland, & USC Center on Public Diplomacy, 2019). Despite its conceptual and methodological flaws (Yun, 2018), Joseph Nye (2015: 7) refers to this report as "the clearest picture of global soft power to date." We use three kinds of data from 2019 Soft Power 30 report: the final index rankings; rankings for engagement sub-index which "measures the reach of countries' diplomatic networks and their commitment to international development and environmental challenges" (Mcclory et al., 2019: 59)¹⁰⁹; and rankings for public opinion polling.¹¹⁰ Public opinion polls give an idea about people's beliefs about and attitudes towards a country which can in turn determine their behavioral outcomes regarding that country (for example, supporting its foreign policies) (Buhmann, 2016; Nye, 2011; Sevin, 2017).

FutureBrand Country Index

The FutureBrand Country Index measures how prominent professionals perceive different countries around the world, in terms of six dimensions: quality of products, tourism, heritage and culture, value system, business potential, and quality of life.¹¹¹ The underlying assumptions regarding public opinion is similar to the ones in Soft

109) There could be an endogeneity problem since the engagement sub-index in Soft Power 30 and the global dimension in SII use similar data.

110) For a more detailed account on Soft Power 30 report, and its methodology, see Mcclory et al. (2019).

111) There could be endogeneity problem when we analyze the correlations with SII because value system and quality of life dimensions measure similar items that were included in SII.

Power 30, the difference being FutureBrand measures elites' opinion about countries, while the former measures ordinary public's opinion. We used the countries' ranks in the FutureBrand Country Index 2019 in our analysis. Furthermore, we created a crosstab using ranks-based quartiles for both the FutureBrand Country Index and SII and computed the chi-square.

Composite Index of National Capability (CINC)

As we mentioned in the conceptual framework, soft power or non-coercive influence in world politics may have significant correlation with material capabilities of countries, mainly due to vague conceptualization of soft power which leads to ambiguous measurement of it. Since we do not run regressions for the purposes of this study, we could not control for the material capabilities when showing influence in world politics (except for representation at international organizations which measured it per capita). Therefore, we show correlations between SII and a highly cited index that measures material capabilities of countries, namely Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) (Singer, Bremer & Stuckey, 1972) which was collected as part of the Correlates of War project. CINC creates an index score based on “annual values for total population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military personnel, and military expenditure of all state members” to measure material capabilities, and we use the latest data available from 2012.¹¹²⁾


112) We use the v.5.0 of National Material capabilities which is available at <https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/national-material-capabilities>.

4.4 Findings

Representation at International Organizations


In order to find the relationship between SII and how countries are represented at international organizations, we made two kinds of analysis. First, we measured the correlation between countries' rankings in SII and rankings based on the number of staff at international organizations per capita. We had the data for 36 of the OECD countries for both datasets. The Spearman's correlation based on the rankings is 0.84. Figure 7-26 also clearly shows strong linear correlation between the two data.

[Figure 7-26] Scatterplot for SII Total x Number of per capita staff at international organizations



Second, we measured the correlation between countries' rankings in SII and rankings based on the excess representation at senior Secretariat positions at United Nations, measured by dividing the number of senior Secretariat positions by a country's population. We had the data for 34 of the OECD countries for both datasets. The Spearman's correlation based on rankings is 0.68. Figure 7-27 also clearly shows nearly strong linear correlation between the two data.


[Figure 7-27] Scatterplot for SII Total x Excess representation at United Nations



Good Country Index

When we look at relationship between SII and the Good Country Index, we looked at two things: 1) correlation between the two indices; and 2) chi-square for crosstab using ranks-based quartiles for the two indices. We had the data for 36 of the OECD countries for both datasets. The Spearman's correlation based on rankings is 0.72. Figure 7-28 also clearly shows strong linear correlation between the two data.

[Figure 7-28] Scatterplot for SII Total x Good Country Index



Furthermore, the chi-square for the crosstab Table 7-18 is 19.11, with a p value of 0.025 showing significant relationship between the two indices.

(Table 7-18) Crosstab for SII Total x Good Country Index


| | | GCC | | | |
|-----|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| | | 1st Quartile | 2nd Quartile | 3rd Quartile | 4th Quartile |
| SII | 1st Quartile | 4 | 3 | 1 | 1 |
| | 2nd Quartile | 4 | 4 | 0 | 1 |
| | 3rd Quartile | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| | 4th Quartile | 0 | 0 | 5 | 4 |

Note: $\chi^2(9, N=36)=19.11, p=0.025$


Soft Power 30

As explained above, we paid attention to three kinds of data from Soft Power 30 when we explored its relation with SII: 1) overall soft power rankings; 2) engagement rankings; and 3) public opinion polling. We had the data for 26 of the OECD countries for both datasets. The Spearman's correlation based on rankings is 0.59 for overall soft power rankings; 0.1 for engagement; and 0.56 for public opinion polling. Figure 7-29 and Figure 7-31 show moderate linear correlation between overall soft power and SII as well as engagement and SII, whereas Figure 7-30 shows no correlation.


[Figure 7-29] Scatterplot for SII Total x Soft Power 30 Overall



[Figure 7–30] Scatterplot for SII Total x Soft Power 30 Engagement




[Figure 7–31] Scatterplot for SII Total x Soft Power 30 Public Opinion Polling



FutureBrand Country Index

We look at two kinds of relationships between SII and the FutureBrand Country Index: 1) correlation between the two indices; and 2) chi-square for crosstab using ranks-based quartiles for the two indices. We had the data for 31 of the OECD countries for both datasets. The Spearman’s correlation based on rankings is 0.78. Figure 7-32 also clearly shows strong linear correlation between the two data.

[Figure 7–32] Scatterplot for SII Total x FutureBrand Country Index

Furthermore, the chi-square for the crosstab Table 7–19 is 23.15, with a p value of 0.006 showing significant relationship between the two indices.


(Table 7–19) Crosstab for SII Total x FutureBrand Country Index

| | | FutureBrand | | | |
|-----|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| | | 1st Quartile | 2nd Quartile | 3rd Quartile | 4th Quartile |
| SII | 1st Quartile | 5 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| | 2nd Quartile | 2 | 3 | 3 | 0 |
| | 3rd Quartile | 1 | 2 | 3 | 2 |
| | 4th Quartile | 0 | 0 | 2 | 5 |

Note: $\chi^2(9, N=31)=23.15, p=0.006$

CINC

We calculated correlations between SII and CINC to show that a country's inclusiveness is not correlated with its material capabilities. We had the data for 33 countries in both datasets. The Spearman's correlation between these two indices is –0.21 (see Figure 7–33).

[Figure 7–33] Scatterplot for SII Total x CINC

The Case of Korea

Korea ranked 32nd in the SII among 36 countries. Korea's rankings are relatively lower in the indices we analyzed in this study. In terms of material capabilities, Korea ranks 7th in the world, and the 3rd among the 33 countries that were included both in SII and CINC, according to CINC. However, in other indices which we analyzed as proxies to examine countries' con-coercive influence in world politics, Korea ranks significantly lower compared to its material capabilities. Korea ranks 15th in terms of number of staff per capita at international organizations (N=36), 28th in excess representation at Secretarial position at the UN (N=34), 24th in Good Country Index (N=36), 19th in Soft Power 30 Overall (N=26), 14th in Soft Power 30 Engagement (N=26), 22nd in Soft Power 30 Public Opinion (N=26), and 18th in FutureBrand Country Index (N=31).

Since Roh Tae-Woo, consecutive Korean governments have been pronouncing Korea as a middle power. This identity projection became more apparent with Roh Moo-Hyun and especially Lee Myung-Bak administrations. While Korea has been echoing traditional middle power behavior in rhetoric, such as bridging between developed and developing countries, leading in international development cooperation,

green growth, and peacekeeping operations among others, the actual behavior has fallen behind those assertive promises (Ayhan, 2019). It becomes more apparent when one goes beyond policy discourse and looks at actual data (Ayhan, 2019). Korea has made much progress to be a leading country in most issue-areas in global governance. Nevertheless, considering that Korea reached 7th rank (3rd among OECD countries) in terms of material capabilities, as measured in CINC, it is not punching above its weight like other small and middle powers, but it is punching way below its weight according to the indices explored in this study. There is no need to suggest a completely brand-new foreign policy for Korea as a prescription to address this problem. The solution is in the middle power rhetoric Korean governments have been employing at least since Lee Myung-Bak. Fulfilling those promises would make Korea more visible, more authoritative, and more influential in world politics, not least for the moral authority it could enjoy.

〈Table 7-20〉 The case of Korea

| Data | N (OECD Countries-only) | Korea's Ranking |
|---|-------------------------|-----------------|
| SII | 36 | 32 |
| Staff per capita at international organizations | 36 | 15 |
| Excess representation at UN | 34 | 28 |
| Good Country Index | 36 | 24 |
| Soft Power 30 Overall | 26 | 19 |
| Soft Power 30 Engagement | 26 | 14 |
| Soft Power 30 Public Opinion | 26 | 22 |
| FutureBrand Country Index | 31 | 18 |
| CINC | 33 | 3 |

4.5 Discussion and Conclusion

The conceptual framework laid out foreign policy behaviors that might potentially provide countries with non-coercive influence in world politics, which can in turn amplify or complement a country's power, understood as a potentiality (Lukes, 2005). Our analyses suggest a correlation between inclusiveness, as defined in SII, and

countries' non-coercive influence in terms of representation at international organizations, being a good or normative country with moral authority, and soft power potential.

Even without doing any quantitative analysis, the first countries that come to mind when one talks about inclusiveness in domestic politics, and normative and moral foreign policy behavior, the countries that first come to mind are the "usual suspects" of "like-minded countries" which are relatively small, wealthy, democratic and emphasize morality in their foreign policies: Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Finland, Denmark, Australia and New Zealand (de Carvalho & Neumann, 2014: 13; see also A. F. Cooper et al., 1993; A. F. Cooper, 2000; Holbraad, 1984; Jordaan, 2003). Indeed, these countries, plus Iceland, lead in the SII. These countries also lead in most of the other indices that we introduced in this chapter. This is not a coincidence. These usual suspects are small or middle powers who emphasize international responsibilities centered around international organizations to maintain the current international order.

While correlations were moderate to significant for all other analyses, the Soft Power 30 engagement sub-index did not correlate at all with SII. This is understandable, because most indicators used in that sub-index do not control for material capabilities. In other words, most indicators use aggregate values rather than per capita values or ratio to GNI, which was for example the case for the analyses for representation at international organizations. If another index were created for engagement that considered material capabilities, the same like-minded countries could have topped the list, leading to more significant correlation with SII. The same is true for the rest of Soft Power 30 and other similar soft power-related indices. These indices tend to have high correlation with countries' material capabilities, that is their hard or economic power, according to Nye's categorization of power (Nye, 2004). A better approach would be controlling for these factors when calculating countries' soft power potential.

Our findings suggest that one possible prescription for especially small and middle powers to punch above their weight is to be more inclusive in their domestic and foreign policies, going beyond narrowly defined national interests. Considering that

global governance of transnational problems, including the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, requires collaboration and coordination between states, international and transnational organizations, and non-state actors, countries that are inclusive or seen as inclusive may be better suited to bridging roles. Indeed, this has been one of the behaviors that traditional middle powers excelled at (A. F. Cooper, 1997; A. F. Cooper et al., 1993), and aspiring middle powers such as Korea have been benchmarking (Ayhan, 2019).

One important limitation for the study was lack of available data. Let it be due to methodological or sometimes ontological reasons, there are no readily available datasets that measure non-coercive influence in world politics. Therefore, our study compensated for this lack by introducing multiple comparison points. Future research can carry out more informative comparative studies by crafting such an influence survey first. Second, our project design prioritized efficiency in comparisons over ontological debates. We focused on proxy rankings and investigated the relationship between them and SII. Future research can compensate for this limitation by carrying out item-by-item correlation analyses to discuss similarities at lower levels than overall rankings.

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